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Estimating the Macroeconomic Effects  
of Each Totalization Agreement 
Abstract 
Totalization agreements coordinate the United States Social Security program with 
other countries’ comparable programs. We estimate each totalization agreement’s 
impact on a variety of bilateral trade outcomes. We find the impact is quite 
heterogeneous, both across agreements/countries and across sectors within a country. 
Moreover, we find agreements that entered into force more recently tend to increase 
total imports and decrease total exports by more than earlier agreements. We find no 
significant relationship between totalization agreements’ estimated impacts and 
economic indicators such as the trade complementarity index between the U.S. and the 
agreement countries. Finally, we find sectors where the U.S. has a larger revealed 
comparative advantage relative to the agreement country tend to experience a larger 
increase in exports following the totalization agreement. However, there is no significant 
relationship between revealed comparative advantage and the estimated impact on 
imports across sectors. In future work, we will investigate in more detail both the 
correlation between the heterogeneity across sectors within a country and the 
heterogeneity across countries, as well as the correlation between totalization 
agreements and the declining U.S. trade balance in the past few decades. 
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Introduction 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the United States established a network of Social 
Security agreements that coordinate the U.S. Social Security program with the 
comparable programs of other countries.1 These international social security 
agreements, often called the “totalization agreements,” have three main purposes. First, 
they eliminated dual social security taxation, the situation that occurs when a worker 
from one country works in another country and is required to pay social security taxes to 
both countries on the same earnings. Second, the agreements help fill gaps in benefit 
protection for workers who have divided their careers between the U.S. and another 
country. Finally, the totalization agreements permit unrestricted benefit payments to 
residents of the two countries. 
Conceptually, by reducing the tax and increasing benefit protection for U.S. 
citizens working in other countries and vice versa, the totalization agreements should 
have a positive effect on U.S. citizens working in countries that have signed such an 
agreement with the U.S., as well as the citizens from those countries working in the U.S. 
By promoting international labor mobility, the totalization agreements could also affect 
other macroeconomic outcomes such as bilateral trade and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
Empirically, Seshadri (2019) finds that, on average, the totalization agreements 
reduce U.S. exports and increase U.S. imports and FDI, with the effects on exports 
being more significant both economically and statistically. The effects are estimated to 
1 This introductory paragraph draws from the description by the Social Security Administration: 
https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html. 
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be quite heterogeneous across countries/agreements. For example, although most of 
the totalization agreements are estimated to reduce U.S. exports, the estimates suggest 
an increase in U.S. exports due to the totalization agreements with countries such as 
Finland, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. Similarly, contrary to the average effect that 
sees an increase in U.S. imports, the estimates suggest a decrease in U.S. imports due 
to the totalization agreements with countries such as Italy, Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
Portugal, South Korea, and Australia. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the macroeconomic 
effects of each totalization agreement. Motivated by Seshadri (2019), we focus on the 
totalization agreements’ heterogenous effects on bilateral trade and proceed in three 
steps.  
First, we use the synthetic control method to estimate the impact of each 
totalization agreement. In addition to the impacts on total exports and total imports as in 
Seshadri (2019), we also estimate the impacts on exports and imports by sector (two-
digit Standard International Trade Classification code).2 Moreover, we measure the 
credibility of each synthetic control estimate using the associated root mean squared 
prediction error. Less credible estimates are ignored. Overall, the results from this step 
are similar to those in Seshadri (2019): The impact is estimated to be heterogeneous 
across agreements; on average the agreements decreased total exports by more than 
they increased total imports; the impact is also heterogeneous across sectors.  
                                               
2 All exports and imports mentioned in this paper are bilateral between the U.S. and the 
countries with which the U.S. has a totalization agreement, and they are measured from the 
perspective of the U.S. For example, when discussing the totalization agreement between the 
U.S. and Italy, total exports refer to the total exports from the U.S. to Italy, and total imports 
refer to the total imports from Italy to the U.S. The exports and imports by sector are defined 
accordingly.  
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Second, we investigate the patterns underlying the heterogeneity across the 
estimated impacts on total exports and total imports. We find agreements that entered 
into force more recently tend to increase total imports and decrease total exports by 
more than earlier agreements. We find no significant relationship between totalization 
agreements’ estimated impacts on bilateral trade and economic indicators such as the 
trade complementarity index between the U.S. and the agreement countries.  
Finally, we move beyond the heterogeneity across agreements/countries and 
explore the patterns underlying the heterogeneous impacts across sectors within an 
agreement/country. We find that sectors where the U.S. has a larger revealed 
comparative advantage relative to the agreement country tend to experience a larger 
increase in exports following the totalization agreement. However, there is no significant 
relationship between revealed comparative advantage and the estimated impact on 
imports across sectors.  
In short, this paper makes two key findings: (1) more recent totalization 
agreements tend to increase total imports and decrease total exports by more than 
earlier agreements; and (2) within an agreement and regardless of implementation date, 
sectors where the U.S. has a larger revealed comparative advantage tend to experience 
a larger increase in exports following the totalization agreements. 
The findings contribute to the understanding of how totalization agreements affect 
bilateral trade. They raise some interesting questions for future research, some of which 
are discussed at the end of the paper.  
While this paper focuses on bilateral trade, we have also done similar analyses for 
FDI and international labor mobility. Partly because of data limitations, we find no 
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systematic pattern regarding these two outcomes. Instead of reporting the details, we 
summarize the main results briefly here.  
We confirm the findings in Seshadri (2019) that the effect on FDI is quite 
heterogeneous across agreements/countries. However, we find no systematic pattern 
underlying this heterogeneity. For example, there is no significant relationship between 
a totalization agreement’s implementation date and its impact on FDI. Part of the reason 
is because FDI is very volatile, making it hard to obtain a credible synthetic control 
estimate. 
Unlike bilateral trade and FDI, official data on international labor mobility is limited. 
We thus turn to the American Community Survey (ACS), even though it has two 
limitations, First, the ACS is only available since 2000. Because five years of data 
before and after the implementation of a totalization agreement is needed, we can only 
use the data to estimate the impacts of the agreements with Japan, Denmark, Czech 
and Poland. Secondly, like any household survey, the ACS may contain significant 
measurement errors, especially for the number of immigrants from relatively small 
countries. Partly for this reason, our estimates for the four countries mentioned above 
are not very precise. One option we could pursue in the future is to use the data on visa 
issuance from the U.S. State Department.     
Data 
The main data used in this paper are annual trade (exports and imports) values 
between the U.S. and other countries, obtained from the UN Comtrade Database.3 In 
                                               
3 https://comtrade.un.org/data/ 
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addition to total exports and imports, we also use the exports and imports by two-digit 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code. To calculate relevant trade 
indicators, we also use the trade values between each country and the rest of the world. 
The date that each totalization agreement entered into force is obtained from the 
Social Security Administration.4  
Empirical strategy 
We proceed in two steps. First, we use the synthetic control method to estimate 
the impact of each totalization agreement on a variety of bilateral trade outcomes. 
Second, to understand the heterogeneity in the estimated impacts, we relate the 
synthetic control estimates to relevant economic/trade indicators.  
Developed recently by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond and 
Hainmueller (2010, 2015), among others, the synthetic control method has been 
described by Athey and Imbens (2017) as “arguably the most important innovation in 
the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years.” Abadie (forthcoming) provides a 
detailed discussion of the method and the related literature. 
In the rest of this section, we describe our implementation of the synthetic control 
method, which is similar to that of Seshadri (2019). The differences between the two 
papers will be highlighted. The economic/trade indicators will be described later when 
we discuss the synthetic control estimates.   
Suppose there is a sample of 𝐼𝐼 + 1 countries indexed by 𝑖𝑖, among which 𝑖𝑖 = 1 is 
the only country with which the U.S. has established a totalization agreement which 
                                               
4 https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html 
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entered into force in year 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The synthetic control estimator of the agreement’s impact 




where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weight of country 𝑖𝑖 such that ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖>1 = 1 and each 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is between 0 and 
1. 
Let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 be a vector of preagreement, i.e., before the year 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, characteristics of 
country 𝑖𝑖, and let 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be its 𝑚𝑚th element. The optimal weight 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is chosen by minimizing 
the following criterion function 






where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the relative importance of the 𝑚𝑚th element. An optimal choice of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
minimizes the mean squared error of the synthetic control estimator. 
Essentially, for the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1, the method constructs a synthetic control 
by properly weighting each of the potential control countries such that the resulting 
synthetic control country mimics the behavior of the treated country before the 
totalization agreement entered into force. The totalization agreement’s effects are then 
measured by the differences in the outcome variable between the treated and the 
synthetic country in the years since the agreement. 
Because the synthetic control country is meant to approximate the counterfactual 
of the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1 in the absence of the totalization agreement, it is important 
to restrict the pool of potential controls to countries similar to the treated country 𝑖𝑖 = 1 in 
the sense that the outcome variable 𝑦𝑦 is driven by the same structural process in both 
the treated country and the potential control countries. For example, in evaluating the 
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effect of the totalization agreements on trade, Zimbabwe may not be a good control for 
Italy if the trade patterns between Zimbabwe and the U.S. are significantly different from 
those between Italy and the U.S. On the other hand, France may be a better control if 
its trade patterns with the U.S. are similar to those between Italy and the U.S. 
Given that the bilateral totalization agreement between the U.S. and other 
countries entered into force at different times, a natural group of potential controls for a 
particular treated country are countries that signed the totalization agreement with the 
U.S. in later years. For example, the first totalization agreement signed between the 
U.S. and Italy entered into force on November 1, 1978. Countries that have signed a 
totalization agreement with the U.S. since then are arguably better controls for Italy in 
estimating the totalization agreement’s effects than other countries that have never 
signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. 
By definition, however, a potential control should not have a totalization agreement 
with the U.S. during the evaluation period. We thus exclude the countries that have 
signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. before the end of the evaluation period, 
and only use the countries that have signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. 
afterward as potential controls. For example, if we want to estimate the totalization 
agreement’s effects between Italy and the U.S. from 1978 to 1983, we would exclude 
(former Federal Republic of) Germany and Switzerland, which signed totalization 
agreements with the U.S. in 1979 and 1980, respectively, and use other countries that 
signed a totalization agreement with the U.S. since 1984 as potential controls. 
Specifically, for each country of interest that has signed a totalization agreement 
with the U.S., we use 11 years of data: the year when the agreement entered into force 
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normalized to be year zero t = 0 in the results reported below, and five years before 
(−5 ≤ t ≤ −1) and after (1 ≤ t ≤ 5) that. We use countries that have signed a 
totalization agreement with the U.S. five years after the country of interest as potential 
controls, and choose the weights such that the resulting weighted average (the 
synthetic control) mimics the behavior of the country of interest in the five years leading 
to the totalization agreement. This is operationalized using equation (2) where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
includes the values of the outcome variable of interest in the five years before the 
agreement 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡<0. This is different from Seshadri (2019) where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 also includes other 
country characteristics like real GDP, population, and distance from the U.S., which are 
ignored in this paper because we find their impacts on the estimates to be minimal. With 
the synthetic control given by the weight for each country 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, we then use equation (1) 
to estimate the effect of the totalization agreement for t ≥ 0. 
For trade outcomes, in addition to total exports and total imports studied in 
Seshadri (2019), we also include their components broken down by two-digit SITC 
codes. All outcomes are measured from the perspective of the U.S. That is, exports and 
imports are the U.S. exports to and imports from another country, respectively. As the 
trade data are relatively volatile, especially for some two-digit SITC codes, we use a 
five-year moving average to limit the influence of temporary shocks. Moreover, for each 
treated country and its potential controls, we normalize the value of each outcome 
variable in the year before the agreement entered into force to be one. The values in 
other years are relative to the year before the agreement entered into force, t = −1. 
This allows us to focus on the impact of the totalization agreements on the growth of 
each outcome variable. Specifically, let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑  be the value of a trade outcome 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 
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observed in data. We first calculate the five-year moving average as 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =
1
5
∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡−4 , 




𝑚𝑚 .  
In the results reported below, we focus on the impact of the totalization agreement 
on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=5, estimated from equation (1) evaluated at t = 5. The estimate could be 
interpreted as the impact of the totalization agreement on the growth rate of the 
outcome variable in the first five years since the agreement entered into force, under the 
assumption that the synthetic control country represents how the treated country would 
have behaved in the absence of the totalization agreement. That is, the approach 
assumes factors other than the totalization agreement, e.g., changes in exchange rates 
and the adoption of the Euro, have exactly the same effects on both the treated and the 
synthetic control country, and thus their effects would be differenced out.  
One advantage of the synthetic control method is transparency. In particular, we 
can use the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) 









calculated using data before the totalization agreement to measure how closely the 
synthetic control mimics the behavior of the outcome of interest in the treated country. 
RMSPE can be viewed as a measure of how credible a synthetic control estimate is, 
with smaller RMSPEs indicating more credible estimates. Consequently, in the results 
reported below, we focus on estimates with relatively small RMSPEs.  
By now, the U.S. has signed a totalization agreement with 30 countries. The last 
one, with Iceland, entered into force on March 1, 2019. Because we need five years of 
data after the agreement to evaluate its effect and at least one similar country that has 
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signed an agreement afterward to construct the synthetic control estimation, we cannot 
evaluate the effect of recently signed agreements. In practice, this includes the six 
agreements signed since 2014. This leaves us with 24 agreements entered into force 
between November 1, 1978 (Italy), and March 1, 2009 (Poland). In practice, however, 
the sample size is smaller due to missing data. First, because the trade data for 
Luxembourg was combined with that of Belgium around 1993, the year when the 
totalization agreement between the U.S. and Luxembourg entered into force, we cannot 
evaluate the effect of this totalization agreement on trade. Secondly, not all countries 
are trading with the U.S. at the level of each two-digit SITC code, so the sample size 




This section reports the RMSPEs associated with the synthetic control estimates. 
The goal is to choose a cutoff value so that estimates whose RMSPEs are above the 
cutoff value are deemed as not credible enough to be included for further analysis.  
To visualize the role of RMSPE, Figure 1 reports the synthetic control estimates of 
two totalization agreements for the U.S.: the one with Ireland in 1993 and the one with 
Poland in 2009. The top left panel reports the impact of the agreement with Ireland on 
total U.S. exports to Ireland in the first five years since the agreement. The synthetic 
control represented by the dashed line does a great job in mimicking the behavior of the 
U.S. exports to Ireland in the five years before the agreement was signed. This is 
summarized/reflected by a small RMSPE of 0.003. In comparison, the RMSPE for the 
top right panel, illustrating the impact of the agreement with Poland on total U.S. exports 
to Poland, is much larger at 0.192. This is consistent with the visual impression that the 
synthetic control in this case does a poor job mimicking the behavior of the treated 
country in the five years before the agreement was signed. Obviously, the estimated 
impact of the totalization agreement with Ireland in the top left panel is much more 
credible than the corresponding estimate for Poland in the top right panel. 
12 
Figure 1: Synthetic control estimates for Ireland and Poland
 
The bottom panels of Figure 1 report the estimated impacts of the two totalization 
agreements on total U.S. imports from the two countries, respectively. In both cases, 
the synthetic control does a reasonably good job of mimicking the behavior of the 
treated country in the five years before the agreement. The RMSPEs for the two cases 
are both around 0.05.  We take this as an indication that estimates with RMSPEs 
around 0.05 are reasonably credible. As a result, we will restrict our analysis in the next 
two sections to estimates whose RMSPEs are below 0.05. Estimates whose RMSPEs 
are at or above 0.05, like those in the two right panels of Figure 1, will be ignored. All 
results are robust to other cutoff values not too far away from 0.05.   
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The solid line in Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of RMSPEs across all 
estimates where the outcome variable is either total exports or total imports. Nearly 90% 
of these estimates are associated with RMSPEs below 0.05. The dashed line is similar 
but for exports and imports broken down by two-digit SITC code. As the trade values for 
the subgroups are more volatile, it is harder to obtain good synthetic controls for them. 
Consequently, fewer than half of the estimates for the subgroups are associated with 
RMSPEs below 0.05. 
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of RMSPE
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Total exports and total imports 
Figure 3 reports the estimated impacts on total exports and total imports for each 
totalization agreement. As mentioned above, we focus on the impact in the fifth year 
since the agreement 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=5, estimated from equation (1) evaluated at t = 5. Given the 
data transformation discussed above, the estimate could be interpreted as the impact of 
the totalization agreement on the growth rate of the outcome variable in the first five 
years since the agreement entered into force. 
Figure 3: Estimated impacts on total exports and imports
 
Similar to the estimates reported in Seshadri (2019), Figure 3 shows that the estimated 
impacts are quite heterogeneous. For total exports, the estimates range from -1.287 to 0.559 
with a mean of -0.22. For total imports, the estimates range from -0.97 to 0.465 with a mean of 
-0.025. Note that countries with only one credible estimate on either total exports or total 
imports but not both are excluded from Figure 3. The average across all credible estimates on 
total exports is -0.238, and the average across all credible estimates on total imports is 0.025. 
These numbers have the same sign as the average effects on total exports and total imports in 
the fifth year reported in Seshadri (2019), which are -0.505 and 0.134, respectively. The 
smaller magnitudes are mainly due to the five-year moving average transformation applied in 
this paper but not in Seshadri (2019).  
Figure 3 suggests a negative correlation between the impacts on total exports and the 
impacts on total imports, and this negative correction is due to the timing of the totalization 
agreements. For example, the totalization agreements with Denmark and Japan signed since 
2005 decreased total exports and increased total imports by more than the agreements with 
Canada and Switzerland which entered into force in early 1980s.  
To see this more directly, Figure 4 plots the two sets of estimates separately against the 
year when each totalization agreement entered into force. Clearly, the top panel shows a 
negative association where the totalization agreements signed in more recent years decreased 
total exports by more than earlier agreements. The slope of the fitted line is -0.021 with a 
standard error of 0.01 and a p-value of 0.053. The bottom panel, on the other hand, shows a 
positive correlation where the totalization agreements signed in more recent years increased 
total imports by more than earlier agreements. The slope of the fitted line is 0.016 with a 
standard error of 0.01 and a p-value of 0.092.
Figure 4: Estimated impacts on total exports and imports, year of agreement
The timing that each totalization agreement entered into force is unlikely to be 
random. In particular, it seems that, unsurprisingly, the U.S. first signed the totalization 
agreements with more developed countries such as Canada and those in western 
Europe before expanding the coverage to include other countries like Chile and South 
Korea. As a result, the associations shown in Figure 4 may not reflect a causal impact 
of timing. It is useful to investigate whether and how the estimated impacts reflect other 
country characteristics.  
One characteristic we consider here is the trade complementarity index (TCI) 
between the U.S. and the agreement countries. TCI provides useful information on 
prospects for bilateral trade in that it shows how well the structures of a country’s 
imports and exports match the structures of another country’s exports and imports.5 
Specifically, the index between countries 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡 is defined as: 






where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the share of good 𝑘𝑘 in global imports of country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the 
share of good 𝑘𝑘 in all exports of country 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡. The index is zero when no goods 
are exported by one country or imported by the other and 1 when the import shares of 
country 𝑖𝑖 match the export shares of country 𝑗𝑗 perfectly. 
For each totalization agreement, let 𝑗𝑗 be the U.S., 𝑖𝑖 be the agreement country, and 
𝑡𝑡 be the year before the agreement entered into force, as is the case for the TCI plotted 
on the horizontal axis of the top panel in Figure 5. A natural hypothesis is that there is a 
                                               
5 This paragraph is adapted from the following site, which also describes a list of other trade 
indicators such as the revealed comparative advantage discussed in the next section: 
https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/Content/Utilities/e1.trade_indicators.htm  
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positive association between TCI and the estimated impact on total exports. This is not 
borne out in data, as suggested by the insignificant relationship between the two 
variables in the top panel. Similarly, let 𝑖𝑖 be the U.S. and 𝑗𝑗 be the agreement country, as 
is the case for the TCI plotted on the horizontal axis of the bottom panel in Figure 5. We 
might expect a positive association between TCI and the estimated impact on total 
imports. This is not borne out in data either, as suggested by the insignificant 
relationship between the two variables in the bottom panel. 
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Figure 5: Estimated impacts on total exports and imports, complementarity
 
20 
In short, relative to Seshadri (2019), who finds heterogeneous impacts of the 
totalization agreements on both U.S. exports to and imports from the agreement 
country, we find the impacts on both exports and imports are significantly correlated 
with the year when a totalization agreement entered into force, with newer agreements 
decreasing total exports and increasing total imports by more than earlier agreements. 
We also find no significant correlation between the estimated impacts and the TCI 
between the U.S. and the agreement countries.   
Exports and imports by sector 
To better understand the impacts of the totalization agreements, we move beyond 
total exports and total imports by estimating the impact for each sector defined by a two-
digit SITC code and relating the estimate to a modified measure of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA).  
RCA measures have been used to help assess a country’s export potential. The 
RCA indicates whether a country is in the process of extending the products in which it 
has a trade potential, as opposed to situations in which the number of products that can 
be competitively exported is static. It can also provide useful information about potential 
trade prospects with new partners. Countries with similar RCA profiles are unlikely to 
have high bilateral trade intensities unless intra-industry trade is involved. RCA 
measures, if estimated at high levels of product disaggregation, can focus attention on 
other nontraditional products that might be successfully exported.  
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For sector 𝑘𝑘 of country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡, the traditional measure of RCA index proposed 





where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the share of sector 𝑘𝑘 in global exports of country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the 
share of sector 𝑘𝑘 in world trade in year 𝑡𝑡. 
Because our focus is on bilateral trade, instead of comparing a country with the 
world, we are more interested in the comparison between two countries. For any 
countries 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, we use the ratio of their RCAs as a measure of country 𝑖𝑖’s revealed 













By construction, 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is between -1 and 1. When it is positive, country 𝑖𝑖 has 
a revealed comparative advantage relative to country 𝑗𝑗 for sector 𝑘𝑘 in year 𝑡𝑡. Otherwise, 
country 𝑗𝑗 has a revealed comparative advantage relative to country 𝑖𝑖.  
In practice, for each totalization agreement, 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is calculated by setting the 
U.S. to be 𝑖𝑖, the agreement country to be 𝑗𝑗, each two-digit SITC code to be 𝑘𝑘, and the 
year before the agreement to be 𝑡𝑡. We will refer to it simply as the revealed comparative 
advantage and study its correlations with the estimated impacts of the totalization 
agreements.   
22 
As an example, Figure 6 plots the estimated impact of two totalization agreements 
on sectorial exports against the corresponding revealed comparative advantage. Each 
dot represents a sector defined by a two-digit SITC code. Only sectors with credible 
estimates are plotted. The top panel is for Denmark whose totalization agreement with 
the U.S. entered into force in 2008. The bottom panel is for (former Federal Republic of) 
Germany whose totalization agreement with the U.S. entered into force in 1979. These 
two countries are chosen for two reasons. First, as neighbors, Denmark and Germany 
are probably more comparable with each other than a random pair of countries. 
Second, the totalization agreements between the U.S. and the two countries were 
signed 29 years apart, allowing us to see whether the timing of a totalization agreement 
has any impact on the correlation between the revealed comparative advantage and the 
estimated impact on sectorial trade. This is motivated by the previous finding that an 
agreement’s timing is significantly correlated with its impact on total exports and total 
imports. 
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Figure 6: Comparative advantage and the estimated impacts on exports
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In both cases, there is a positive correlation between the revealed comparative 
advantage of a sector and the estimated impact of the totalization agreement on the 
sectorial exports from the U.S. to the agreement country. For Germany, the positive 
association is robust to the exclusion of the three sectors which decreased exports the 
most (petroleum and petroleum productions; footwear; and sugar, sugar preparations, 
and honey). Intuitively, sectors where the U.S. has a larger comparative advantage on 
average experienced a larger increase in exports due to the totalization agreement. This 
is true for both agreements signed 29 years apart, suggesting that the relationship is not 
unique to either the newest or the oldest agreements.  
Turning now to imports, Figure 7 suggests that there is no significant relationship 
between the revealed comparative advantage of a sector and the totalization 
agreement’s estimated impact on the sectorial imports for the U.S. from the agreement 
country, at least for Denmark and Germany. 
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Figure 7: Comparative advantage and the estimated impacts on imports
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The patterns in Figure 6 and Figure 7 are not unique, as suggested by the 
regression results in Table 1, which pools all countries together. Consistent with Figure 
6, the upper panel of Table 1 shows a statistically significant relationship between the 
revealed comparative advantage of a sector and the estimated impact of the totalization 
agreement on the sectorial exports from the U.S. to the agreement country. In 
particular, comparisons across the specifications in the three columns suggest that the 
correlation is robust to the inclusion of both country and sectorial fixed effects. In 
contrast, but consistent with Figure 7, the three columns in the bottom panel suggest 
that there is no significant relationship between the revealed comparative advantage of 
a sector and the estimated impact of the totalization agreement on the sectorial imports 
for the U.S. from the agreement country. 
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Table 1: Comparative advantage and the effects of totalization agreements 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Exports    
Revealed Comparative Advantage 0.466** 0.357* 0.483** 
 (0.196) (0.204) (0.245) 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Two-digit SITC code dummies No No Yes 
N 464 464 464 
    
Panel B: Imports    
Revealed Comparative Advantage -0.016 0.152 -0.372 
 (0.308) (0.330) (0.414) 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Two-digit SITC code dummies No No Yes 
N 379 379 379 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Summary and future work 
We estimate the impact of each totalization agreement on a variety of bilateral 
trade outcomes using the synthetic control method. Consistent with Seshadri (2019), we 
find the impact is quite heterogeneous, not only across agreements/countries but also 
across sectors within a country. Moreover, we find agreements that entered into force 
more recently tend to increase total imports and decrease total exports by more than 
earlier agreements. We find no significant relationship between the estimated impacts of 
the totalization agreements and economic indicators such as the trade complementarity 
index between the U.S. and the agreement countries. Finally, we find that sectors where 
the U.S. has a larger revealed comparative advantage relative to the agreement country 
tend to experience a larger increase in exports following the totalization agreement, but 
there is no significant relationship between revealed comparative advantage and the 
estimated impact on imports across sectors.  
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The findings contribute to the understanding of how totalization agreements affect 
bilateral trade, which could be used to forecast the impact and guide the design of 
future totalization agreements. For example, if fostering U.S. exports in a particular 
sector is important, the findings in this paper suggest a totalization agreement with a 
country where the U.S. has the largest revealed comparative advantage in that sector 
might help.  
The findings also raise some interesting questions for future research. For 
example: How are the last finding across sectors within a country related to the second 
finding about the timing of an agreement? In particular, is it the case that more recent 
agreements tend to involve countries that are more specialized in exporting to the U.S. 
the goods that they have a larger comparative advantage but are less specialized in 
importing from the U.S. the goods they have a smaller comparative advantage? 
Additionally, how are the totalization agreements related to the declining U.S. trade 
balance over the last few decades? Is it the case that the totalization agreements simply 
magnify the existing trade balance so that the second finding about timing arises 
because more recent agreements tend to be implemented when the U.S. trade deficit is 
larger? We plan to investigate these questions in future work. The answers to these 
questions could contribute to our understanding of not only the impact of the totalization 
agreements, but also the relationship between international labor mobility and trade in 
general, a long-standing topic studied by Mundell (1957), Wong (1986) and Gould 
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